Why The US And Europe Fear BRICS Expansion: Can Western Sanctions Still Work?

BRICS expansion is making Western policymakers rethink how influence works in a more crowded international system. The concern is not that BRICS has suddenly become a single anti-Western alliance, but that its growth gives more countries room to trade, finance and negotiate outside the usual US- and Europe-led channels. That is why BRICS expansion fears are closely tied to sanctions, energy markets, payment systems and wider global power shifts.

Why Does BRICS Expansion Worry Washington and Brussels?

BRICS expansion worries the US and Europe because it brings together large emerging economies, major energy producers, strategic trade routes and countries that often want more freedom from Western pressure. As of 2026, official BRICS-facing sources list 11 members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

That wider membership matters because sanctions work best when the target has few credible alternatives. If a sanctioned state can redirect exports, settle trade in non-dollar currencies, use intermediaries or deepen ties with states unwilling to enforce Western restrictions, pressure becomes harder to maintain. BRICS does not need to act like NATO or the EU to affect sanctions; it only needs to create more economic optionality.

The Fear Is About Leverage, Not Just Ideology

The West’s concern is often framed as a clash between democracy and authoritarianism, but the deeper issue is leverage. The US and Europe have long benefited from central roles in finance, insurance, shipping, technology and reserve currencies. When access to those systems can be restricted, sanctions become a powerful tool.

Expanded BRICS membership complicates that picture. China and India are enormous markets. Russia and Iran bring sanctions experience. Gulf members add energy and capital. Egypt and Ethiopia expand the bloc’s African and Red Sea relevance, while Indonesia strengthens its Southeast Asian weight. The official BRICS platform says the group represents a large share of world population and territory, while its share of global GDP in purchasing power terms has risen over time.

This is where BRICS expansion fears become practical rather than symbolic. Western officials are not simply worried about speeches at summits. They are watching whether more trade routes, banks, insurers, commodity traders and technology suppliers become available to countries under pressure.

Can Western Sanctions Still Work?

Yes, Western sanctions can still work, but they are becoming more conditional. They remain strongest when the US, EU, UK, Japan, Canada, Australia and other partners coordinate tightly, when the target depends on Western technology or finance, and when enforcement follows the goods, money and intermediaries rather than stopping at the first banned transaction.

Sanctions are not magic switches. They rarely force immediate policy reversals on their own. Their effect is usually cumulative: raising costs, slowing access to advanced inputs, limiting investment and making military or strategic projects more expensive. The EU continues to argue that its Russia sanctions damage Moscow’s ability to wage war, manufacture weapons and repair systems.

But the expansion of alternative networks makes sanctions leakier. The European Commission’s 18th Russia sanctions package, adopted in July 2025, added entities linked to direct or indirect support for Russia’s military-industrial base and sanctions circumvention.

The US Treasury has also continued targeting sanctions-evasion schemes involving third-country entities.

How BRICS Changes the Sanctions Calculus

BRICS expansion affects sanctions less through one dramatic break and more through several smaller shifts that add up.

• More Trade Diversion Options: Sanctioned countries may redirect exports to buyers outside the Western coalition, often at a discount but still with revenue attached.
• More Intermediary Risk: Goods can move through third countries before reaching restricted end users, making enforcement more complex.
• More Currency Experimentation: BRICS members have discussed reducing dependence on the dollar, even if a common BRICS currency remains politically and technically difficult.
• More Diplomatic Cover: A larger bloc can make it harder for Western governments to isolate a target in international forums.
• More Fragmented Compliance: Companies, banks and ports in non-Western jurisdictions may vary widely in how strictly they follow Western rules.

None of this means sanctions are obsolete. It means the West must treat sanctions as a system, not a press release. Export controls need end-use checks. Financial restrictions need intelligence sharing. Oil and shipping measures need maritime enforcement. Diplomatic outreach matters because many countries outside the West do not want to choose sides permanently.

The Limits of BRICS Unity Still Matter

BRICS is influential, but it is not a seamless bloc. Its members have different political systems, security priorities, currency interests and regional rivalries. India and China compete strategically. Iran and Gulf states do not always want the same Middle East outcomes. Commodity exporters and importers can have opposing views on prices.

That diversity limits how far BRICS can go as a sanctions shield. A member may welcome trade with Russia or Iran while still avoiding secondary sanctions from the US. A bank may support local-currency settlement but avoid transactions that threaten access to dollar clearing. A government may criticise Western dominance while still seeking investment from Europe and the US.

For Washington and Brussels, this is the opening. Instead of treating BRICS as a single hostile camp, they can work issue by issue with countries that have mixed incentives. Many emerging economies want reform of global governance, not permanent confrontation with the West.

What Should Policymakers and Businesses Watch Next?

They should watch implementation, not just summit language. The key question is whether expanded BRICS cooperation produces practical infrastructure that reduces exposure to Western pressure.

Useful signals include:

1. Payment Channels: Are more cross-border payments being settled outside dollar- or euro-linked systems?
2. Energy Flows: Are oil, gas and refined products finding durable alternative routes despite restrictions?
3. Bank Behaviour: Are major banks willing to handle sensitive trade, or only smaller institutions with limited Western exposure?
4. Technology Leakage: Are controlled components still reaching sanctioned industries through intermediaries?
5. Partner-Country Alignment: Are newer BRICS partners coordinating policy, or mainly using the platform for visibility?

Businesses should also recognise the compliance risk. A transaction that looks local may still involve restricted goods, sanctioned end users or shipping networks under scrutiny. As sanctions enforcement becomes more sophisticated, ‘I did not know’ is a weaker defence than documented due diligence.

The Takeaway

BRICS expansion is one of the clearest signs that global power is becoming more distributed. The US and Europe still hold major advantages in finance, technology, alliances and regulatory reach, but those advantages now face more workarounds than before.

Western sanctions can still work, especially when they are coordinated, targeted and enforced beyond Western borders. But in a world shaped by global power shifts, sanctions must be paired with diplomacy, trade strategy and credible partnerships with countries that do not want to live under either Western dominance or anti-Western dependency.

Also Read: Riding Two Boats: How Prime Minister Modi Balances QUAD With The US And BRICS With Russia, China