Will Pakistan Join BRICS? Why India Holds The Ultimate Veto Power Over Islamabad’s Entry

Pakistan’s bid to enter BRICS is back in focus as India prepares to host the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12–13. Islamabad has formally sought a place in the grouping, but its path remains blocked by a basic rule: expansion requires consensus among existing members, giving India decisive leverage over any Pakistan BRICS membership push.

India’s role is especially important this week because it holds the BRICS chairship for 2026 and will host leaders of member and partner countries at Bharat Mandapam. The summit is expected to focus on intra-BRICS cooperation, global and regional issues, and India’s chairship theme of ‘Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability’.

Can Pakistan Join BRICS While India Objects?

In practical terms, no, BRICS does not admit new members by simple majority vote; its expansion and partner-country decisions are handled through consultation and consensus, which means every existing member has to be comfortable with the move. That does not give India a ‘veto’ in the United Nations Security Council sense, but it gives New Delhi an effective blocking power if Pakistan’s entry is placed before the group.

That consensus rule is the central reason Pakistan’s application is politically difficult, even if China or Russia favours Islamabad’s inclusion. Pakistan enjoys close ties with China and has courted Russian support, but neither country can override a membership process that requires agreement across the bloc. For Islamabad, this means diplomacy with Beijing and Moscow is useful but insufficient without at least a workable accommodation with India.

Pakistan’s Application Is Formal, but the Road Has Narrowed

Pakistan confirmed on November 23, 2023, that it had made a formal request to join BRICS after the group’s Johannesburg expansion decisions. Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson Mumtaz Zahra Baloch said at the time that Islamabad saw BRICS as an important grouping of developing countries and hoped the bloc would consider its request in the spirit of inclusive multilateralism.

The application reflected a broader shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy. Islamabad has been trying to diversify its external partnerships at a time when BRICS has become more attractive to countries seeking greater space in a multipolar economic order. Pakistan’s stated argument is that it can contribute to international cooperation, developing-country coordination and multilateral reform if admitted to the bloc.

But the timing also matters. Since Pakistan submitted its request, BRICS has moved from a smaller five-member format into a larger, more complicated grouping. Expansion has increased the bloc’s global profile, but it has also made internal consensus harder, especially where security disputes, regional rivalries and competing foreign-policy priorities are involved. A May 2026 BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New Delhi ended without a joint statement because of differences over the Middle East, underlining how difficult unified positions can be in the enlarged bloc.

The Current BRICS Countries List Shows Why the Bloc Matters

The current BRICS countries list includes the original five—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—plus Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, according to official BRICS and Indian summit materials. Indonesia was formally admitted in January 2025, while the wider expansion followed the 2023 Johannesburg process and subsequent accession steps.

This wider membership is what makes Pakistan BRICS membership attractive. The bloc now spans major energy producers, large consumer markets, significant Asian and African economies, and countries pushing for reform of global governance institutions. For Pakistan, BRICS membership would offer both symbolic value and diplomatic utility. It would signal that Islamabad can engage beyond any single strategic camp and participate in platforms linked to the Global South.

Still, expansion has not erased the bloc’s political constraints. The BRICS process places weight on good diplomatic relations with all members, geographic balance, support for multilateral reform and consensus among leaders. India-Pakistan tensions therefore cut directly into the admission question, not as a side issue but as a core procedural and political barrier.

Why India Is Unlikely to Wave Pakistan Through Quickly

India’s likely hesitation is rooted in both bilateral security concerns and institutional strategy. New Delhi has long argued in multilateral forums that cross-border terrorism and regional security cannot be separated from economic cooperation, and it has previously taken hard positions in regional groupings when Pakistan-related language or security concerns were involved. In June 2025, for example, India declined to sign a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation statement it viewed as insufficient on terrorism concerns after an attack on Indian tourists.

BRICS is also one of the few global platforms where India sits alongside China and Russia while retaining space for its own strategic autonomy. If BRICS added Pakistan without India’s support, New Delhi could view the bloc as increasingly aligned with China’s regional preferences. That concern matters because Pakistan’s closest major-power partner is China, while India and China remain competitors despite sharing BRICS membership.

India may also prefer to slow expansion until BRICS consolidates its newer members and partner-country category. Official summit language has already emphasised the need to strengthen cooperation across political-security, economic-financial and people-to-people pillars. Adding a deeply contested South Asian rival could complicate that agenda just as India is using its 2026 chairship to project BRICS as practical, development-oriented and consensus-based.

The Possible Benefits for Pakistan Are Real but Not Automatic

The phrase ‘Pakistan BRICS membership benefits’ typically refers to trade, financing, investment and diplomatic visibility. Those potential benefits exist, but membership would not immediately solve Pakistan’s economic problems or guarantee new money. BRICS is a political and economic coordination platform, not a customs union, bailout fund or automatic market-access arrangement.

The most realistic benefits would be indirect and gradual:

• Diplomatic Visibility: Pakistan would gain a seat in a high-profile forum that includes major developing economies and energy producers.
• Economic Networking: Pakistani officials and businesses could pursue more structured engagement with BRICS trade, investment, technology and development tracks.
• Financing Pathways: Closer BRICS ties could help Islamabad explore relationships with institutions connected to the grouping, including the New Development Bank, although NDB membership is a separate process.
• Foreign-Policy Balancing: Islamabad could use BRICS participation to demonstrate a foreign policy beyond Western, Chinese or Islamic-world platforms.
• Global South Positioning: Pakistan could align more visibly with debates on reforming global governance and strengthening developing-country representation.

The New Development Bank illustrates the distinction between symbolism and tangible benefit. BRICS countries established the bank to mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing economies. The bank’s agreement allows UN members to join. Pakistan is not a current or prospective NDB member, so BRICS membership would not guarantee immediate NDB financing.

China and Russia Can Help, but They Cannot Decide Alone

China and Russia remain important to Pakistan’s campaign. Pakistan’s ambassador to Russia said in 2023 that Islamabad was seeking support from member countries and was counting on Moscow’s assistance during Russia’s BRICS presidency. That message showed Pakistan’s understanding that the bid would need active lobbying, not just a formal letter.

But the consensus rule changes the maths. Even strong backing from Beijing and Moscow would only create pressure for discussion; it would not create admission. Brazil, South Africa, India and newer members would also have to weigh whether Pakistan’s entry strengthens the bloc or imports another unresolved bilateral dispute into an already crowded agenda.

This is why India holds the ultimate leverage over Islamabad’s entry. It does not need to launch a public campaign against Pakistan. It can simply withhold consensus, insist on criteria or argue that BRICS should first consolidate existing expansion and partner mechanisms.

What Happens Next at the New Delhi Summit?

The September 12–13 summit is unlikely to turn solely on Pakistan’s application. India has framed the summit around resilience, innovation, cooperation, sustainability and practical development outcomes, with more than 350 meetings and high-level engagements held across India under its chairship.

For Pakistan, the most important signals will be procedural rather than dramatic. Observers should watch whether the final summit language mentions future expansion, partner-country pathways, membership criteria or the need for consolidation. Any reference to consensus and good relations with existing members would reinforce India’s position; any new roadmap for applicants could give Islamabad a longer-term opening.

For now, Pakistan’s BRICS bid is alive but constrained. Islamabad can continue lobbying, and the potential benefits explain why it would want to keep the issue on the table. Yet unless India’s objections soften, Pakistan’s BRICS membership remains a distant prospect rather than an imminent diplomatic breakthrough.

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