The Lithium Rare Earth Monopoly: How BRICS Nations Influence EV Battery Materials

The global EV boom is not just a car story. It is a minerals, refining and industrial strategy story, and much of the pressure sits around the so-called lithium rare earth monopoly. BRICS countries, especially China and Indonesia, now matter because they influence key parts of the lithium supply chain, rare earth elements, nickel, graphite and the processing capacity that turns raw materials into battery-ready inputs.

Is There Really a Lithium Rare Earth Monopoly?

There is not one single company or country that owns every EV mineral, so ‘monopoly’ is more useful as shorthand than as a literal legal term. The real issue is concentration: a small group of countries dominates mining, refining or both, and China is the central player in processing. The IEA reported that, for copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earth elements, the average market share of the top three refining nations rose to 86% in 2024, with China the leading source of supply growth for most of those minerals.

That distinction matters. A lithium deposit in one country does not automatically create a secure battery supply if refining, cathode production, anode production, magnet manufacturing and cell manufacturing happen somewhere else. The lithium-rare-earth monopoly conversation is really about chokepoints: where material is upgraded, purified, separated and qualified for industrial use.

BRICS Has Become a Minerals Power Bloc

BRICS began as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, but the group has expanded. As of the 2024–25 expansion cycle, BRICS sources list Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as members. That matters because the expanded bloc includes major producers, refiners, energy exporters, industrial manufacturers and fast-growing consumer markets.

The group is not a single command centre for critical minerals. Its members have different interests, trade relationships, environmental rules and levels of industrial capacity. Still, when investors and policymakers talk about BRICS control of EV battery materials, they are usually pointing to the combined weight of China’s refining base, Indonesia’s nickel expansion, Brazil’s mineral potential, Russia’s metals position, South Africa’s mining sector and the capital and energy influence of Gulf members.

This is why the ‘70%’ claim needs careful reading. Depending on which minerals and which stage of the value chain are counted, concentration can be above or below that figure. In 2025, the IEA projected that China would still supply over 60% of refined lithium and cobalt in 2035 and around 80% of battery-grade graphite and rare earth elements, showing that the strongest leverage is downstream processing, not just mine ownership.

The Lithium Supply Chain Is Deeper Than the Mine

Lithium gets attention because it is central to most rechargeable EV battery chemistries. But the lithium supply chain has several stages, and risk can appear at any of them. Exploration must become a permitted mine, mined material must become concentrate or brine product, and that product must then be refined into battery-grade lithium carbonate or lithium hydroxide.

For automakers, the most important question is not only ‘where is the lithium?’ It is also ‘who can deliver qualified material consistently, at scale and under contract?’ That is why refining capacity has become strategic infrastructure. The IEA’s 2026 outlook said lithium demand had been growing strongly, while supply growth in recent years was driven heavily by top producers, including China for most key energy minerals.

Key pressure points include:

• Permitting timelines: New mines can take years to move from discovery to production, especially in jurisdictions with complex environmental reviews.
• Chemical conversion: Battery-grade refining requires technical know-how, reagent access, energy, water management and customer qualification.
• Price volatility: Lithium prices can fall when supply expands faster than demand, then rise again when investment slows.
• Geopolitical alignment: Trade restrictions, local-content rules and strategic stockpiles can reshape where material flows.
• Technology shifts: LFP, sodium-ion, solid-state batteries and recycling can change demand growth, though they do not remove mineral dependence overnight.

Rare Earth Elements Are Not the Same as Lithium

Rare earth elements are often grouped with battery metals, but they play a different role in the EV ecosystem. Lithium goes into the battery. Rare earth elements such as neodymium and dysprosium are mainly associated with high-performance permanent magnets used in many EV motors, wind turbines, electronics and defence applications.

This difference matters because ‘rare earth resources’ can be misunderstood. Rare earths are not necessarily rare in the ground; the difficult part is finding deposits that can be mined economically and processed without creating unacceptable environmental or chemical waste. Separation is technically demanding because the elements have similar chemical properties, and building a reliable separation industry takes time, expertise and long-term customers.

China’s position in rare earth processing remains the clearest example of the chokepoint problem. The IEA’s 2025 outlook reported that rare earth refining was highly concentrated, with China representing 91% of refined output in 2024, while industrial-scale production outside China was limited to a relatively small group of facilities.

Why Does China Sit at the Centre?

China sits at the centre because it built processing capacity, manufacturing demand, technical expertise and industrial policy around critical minerals before many competitors treated them as strategic. Its advantage is not only geology. It is the combination of mines, refineries, chemical plants, component makers, battery manufacturers, magnet producers, ports, financing and domestic demand.

The USGS reported in its 2026 Mineral Commodity Summaries that China was the leading producer for 20 of the 60 critical minerals for which reliable estimates were available, including the lanthanides listed under rare earths. That production leadership reinforces China’s processing strength, but the refining lead is even more important for EVs because manufacturers need usable materials, not just ore.

This creates a strategic dilemma for the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea and other import-dependent economies. They may have allies with resources, but they still need refining, recycling, permitting, labour, infrastructure and offtake agreements. Diversification is possible, but it is not instant.

BRICS Control Is Uneven but Strategically Important

Calling this a BRICS-wide lithium rare earth monopoly can overstate coordination among member states. China does not represent every BRICS interest, and Indonesia’s nickel strategy is not the same as Brazil’s lithium or rare earth ambitions. India is also a major demand centre and manufacturing aspirant, not simply a raw-material exporter.

Still, BRICS countries collectively sit near important parts of the mineral map. Indonesia has become central to nickel supply growth, China dominates many refining steps, Brazil has notable rare earth resources and lithium potential, Russia has strategic metals expertise, and South Africa remains important in mining and mineral processing. The expanded bloc also includes energy-rich economies that can finance infrastructure, supply power or influence trade relationships.

For companies, this means supplier risk is no longer just a procurement issue. It is a board-level strategy question. A battery maker may need to evaluate whether its inputs depend on one country, one refiner, one shipping corridor or one political relationship.

What This Means for Lithium Investment Opportunities

Lithium investment opportunities now extend beyond exposure to mining companies. The more interesting question is where value and scarcity may appear across the chain. During boom cycles, investors often chase the resource owner; during consolidation cycles, they pay more attention to cost position, balance-sheet strength, customer contracts, processing capability and jurisdictional risk.

Potential areas to watch include:

1. Low-cost lithium producers with credible expansion plans and disciplined capital spending.
2. Refining and conversion projects outside dominant supply hubs, especially where customers want regional supply.
3. Recycling companies that can recover lithium, nickel, cobalt and other materials from batteries and production scrap.
4. Rare earth separation and magnet supply chains in countries trying to reduce dependence on imports.
5. Enabling technologies such as direct lithium extraction, waste reprocessing and cleaner separation methods.

Investors should also be cautious. Critical minerals are politically important, but that does not make every project profitable. A promising deposit can still fail because of permitting delays, weak infrastructure, poor metallurgy, low prices, funding gaps or community opposition. The best opportunities are usually those that combine resource quality with realistic development plans and access to qualified buyers.

The Road Away from Concentration Is Slow

Governments are trying to reduce exposure through domestic mining incentives, friend-shoring, recycling mandates, strategic stockpiles and support for processing plants. The United States, Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan and others have all moved critical minerals higher on the policy agenda. Decades-old supply chains cannot replace themselves with announcements alone.

The IEA’s 2026 outlook noted that rare earth refining concentration declined modestly as new projects in the United States and production increases in Malaysia added some diversification. That is a useful signal, but it does not erase the broader pattern. Most mineral supply chains still depend on a few dominant processing centres.

For EV buyers, the result may be invisible until disruption occurs. For automakers and battery companies, it is already visible in supplier qualification, cost planning and long-term sourcing contracts. Similarly, for investors, the opportunity is not simply ‘more lithium’; it is better resilience across the entire mineral-to-battery pathway.

The Takeaway

The lithium rare earth monopoly reflects a concentration of refining and industrial capacity, rather than simply the locations of underground mineral deposits. BRICS countries matter because the expanded group includes several of the world’s most important mineral, energy and manufacturing players, with China at the centre of processing dominance.

The next phase of the EV transition will depend on who can build reliable, cleaner and more diversified supply chains. Lithium, rare earth elements, graphite, nickel and recycling will all remain part of that story. The winners will be the countries and companies that turn rare earth resources and battery minerals into dependable industrial ecosystems, not just headline-grabbing deposits.

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