AI Generated Image
The emerging BRICS payments agenda is not a single switch that can instantly replace SWIFT or the IMF. It is a growing set of financial infrastructure proposals designed to make cross-border settlement faster, cheaper, more resilient, and less dependent on the dollar-centred correspondent banking system.
For businesses, banks, and policymakers, the real story is less dramatic than ‘SWIFT is finished’ but more important than ‘nothing will change’.
At the centre of the debate is the proposed BRICS interbank payment system, a phrase often used to describe BRICS efforts involving local-currency settlement, payment connectivity, digital finance, and alternative clearing arrangements. The practical question is whether these tools can reduce friction in trade among BRICS members without fragmenting global finance.
The BRICS interbank payment system is best understood as an emerging network of proposals and payment initiatives rather than one fully operational global replacement for SWIFT. The 2024 Kazan Declaration encouraged stronger correspondent banking networks within BRICS, local-currency settlement, and further discussions under the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative, which it described as voluntary and non-binding.
It also supported feasibility work on independent settlement and depository infrastructure, including BRICS Clear.
That distinction matters. SWIFT is a mature global messaging cooperative used by banks and financial institutions to communicate securely about cross-border transactions. It does not itself move money. SWIFT says it connects more than 11,500 institutions across more than 200 countries and territories, with millions of messages sent daily.
Therefore, the BRICS challenge is not simply a case of a ‘new app versus an old network’. It is a broader attempt to build optional settlement pathways that could operate alongside existing banks, central bank systems, domestic payment schemes, and foreign exchange markets.
The BRICS agenda reflects a mix of economic, political, and operational considerations. Cross-border payments can still be slow, expensive, opaque, and dependent on multiple intermediaries, particularly when transactions involve emerging markets, thin currency corridors, or compliance-sensitive counterparties.
The Financial Stability Board’s G20 cross-border payments work has also emphasised the global need for faster, cheaper, more transparent, and more inclusive cross-border payments.
For BRICS members, the motivation goes further. More local-currency settlement could reduce exposure to dollar liquidity cycles, lower conversion costs in some trade corridors, and support transactions that do not naturally require a dollar leg. It could also provide participating countries with greater redundancy if geopolitical tensions, sanctions, or correspondent banking withdrawals disrupt traditional channels.
The expanded BRICS bloc adds urgency to this discussion. BRICS now includes eleven countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, according to BRICS sources and recent government statements.
More members mean more potential trade corridors, but also greater regulatory complexity, more currencies, and more political differences to manage.
A credible BRICS payment system would require more than a political declaration. It would need trusted messaging, settlement assets, liquidity, compliance controls, dispute processes, cyber resilience, and clear legal responsibilities.
The most realistic version is likely to be modular, with several components developing at different speeds.
Key components to watch include:
Project mBridge shows why central banks are interested in this direction. The BIS said in 2024 that mBridge had reached a minimum viable product stage, with a wholesale CBDC platform designed to support cross-border payments and foreign exchange transactions among participating central banks.
Even if BRICS develops its own path, mBridge illustrates the technical direction: fewer intermediaries, near-real-time settlement, and multi-currency functionality.
The challenge to SWIFT is not that BRICS can instantly replicate its global reach. SWIFT’s advantage lies in its network scale, standardisation, trust, compliance integration, and deep bank adoption. It is also modernising through ISO 20022 and faster cross-border payment services, which means the incumbent is not standing still.
The challenge is subtler. BRICS can reduce the assumption that every important cross-border transaction must rely on the same Western-centred messaging and settlement ecosystem.
If enough trade among BRICS members can be invoiced, financed, messaged, and settled through alternative channels, SWIFT would remain important but become less exclusive.
This creates three forms of pressure:
Still, replacing SWIFT is far harder than criticising it. Banks choose infrastructure based on reliability, legal certainty, counterparties, liquidity, and regulatory acceptance. A new BRICS rail would have to win trust transaction by transaction.
Not directly. The IMF provides macroeconomic surveillance, policy advice, technical assistance, and balance-of-payments lending to member countries. It is not a payment messaging network.
The IMF describes itself as supporting financial stability and monetary cooperation among 191 member countries, including through crisis lending.
BRICS financial architecture already includes institutions that are closer to an IMF or World Bank comparison. The New Development Bank was created to mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging markets and developing countries. Meanwhile, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement is designed to provide support during actual or potential balance-of-payments pressure.
The payment initiative plays a different role. It is infrastructure, not a rescue lender. It may complement BRICS development finance by making settlement easier, but it does not replace the IMF’s surveillance function, conditional lending framework, or near-global membership.
The BRICS currency exchange debate is often confused with discussions about a single BRICS currency. A shared BRICS currency would require deep monetary coordination, compatible inflation frameworks, fiscal trust, capital mobility, and political agreement among economies with very different structures.
That would be a much heavier task than building better local-currency payment channels.
A more plausible near-term model is multi-currency settlement. Under this model, a Brazilian exporter, Indian importer, Emirati bank, or Chinese supplier could use more direct currency corridors when commercial conditions make sense. Foreign exchange would still matter, but the transaction would not automatically need to pass through the dollar at every stage.
This is where liquidity becomes the central issue. The dollar remains deeply embedded in global foreign exchange markets. BIS data for April 2025 showed the US dollar on one side of 89.2% of global foreign exchange trades. IMF research also found that SWIFT cross-border payments remained dominated by US dollar and euro transactions during 2021–2024, with the renminbi growing from a low base.
In plain English, BRICS can encourage more local-currency exchange, but liquidity cannot be declared into existence. Companies will use new routes when pricing, settlement speed, convertibility, hedging, and legal certainty prove better than those offered by familiar channels.
If executed well, the BRICS interbank payment system could offer practical benefits for trade-heavy businesses and banks operating across emerging markets. The strongest case is not ideological; it is operational.
Potential benefits include:
For small and midsize exporters, the immediate benefit would not be abstract ‘de-dollarisation’. It would be simpler reconciliation, clearer payment status, fewer unexpected deductions, and greater predictability when receiving funds.
These everyday improvements will determine whether a new system gains users.
The same features that make BRICS payment infrastructure attractive to some countries may make others cautious. If alternative systems are perceived mainly as sanctions-evasion tools, they could face stronger scrutiny from Western regulators, banks, and compliance teams.
That could limit adoption by global companies that cannot afford secondary sanctions risk or reputational exposure.
BRICS members also face internal challenges. They have different exchange-rate regimes, capital controls, banking rules, inflation histories, digital currency strategies, and geopolitical priorities.
Building a trusted settlement layer across such a diverse group requires essential but less visible work, including legal agreements, dispute resolution, cybersecurity standards, liquidity backstops, and anti-money-laundering controls.
Fragmentation can also raise costs. If banks must maintain parallel systems for SWIFT, domestic networks, Chinese payment rails, regional instant payment links, and BRICS channels, the compliance and technology burden may increase before it falls.
The smartest response is neither panic nor dismissal. A BRICS payment system could become important in specific corridors long before it becomes global. Decision-makers should track practical adoption rather than slogans.
A useful monitoring checklist includes:
For treasurers, the practical move is to map exposure. Identify trade corridors where payment delays, foreign exchange spreads, or correspondent banking issues already create significant costs. Those are the corridors where BRICS alternatives may become commercially relevant first.
The BRICS payments push is best seen as part of a broader move towards financial multipolarity. SWIFT remains deeply entrenched, the dollar continues to offer substantial liquidity, and the IMF retains a distinct role in global financial stability.
However, BRICS members are clearly trying to create more options, particularly for trade among emerging economies.
The outcome will depend on execution. If the system delivers trusted, compliant, liquid, and user-friendly settlement, it can reshape selected payment corridors. If it remains largely political branding, SWIFT dominance will continue with only marginal disruption.
The likely future is not one winner replacing every other network. It is a more complex landscape in which SWIFT, domestic instant payment systems, CBDC platforms, local-currency arrangements, and the BRICS payment system coexist.
For global finance, that may be less like a revolution and more like a slow rewiring of the pipes beneath international trade.
Also Read: The Lithium Rare Earth Monopoly: How BRICS Nations Influence EV Battery Materials
Union Home and Cooperation Minister Amit Shah arrived in Bhopal as Madhya Pradesh expands dairy…
DailyObjects has launched its largest-ever iPhone case collection, introducing new Stack styles for the iPhone…
Bharat Express CMD Upendrra Rai attended a gala dinner in Kolkata ahead of the historic…
Prime Minister Narendra Modi hailed India’s women’s hockey team after its 1-0 victory over China…
Adani Group Managing Director Pranav Adani welcomed the Maharashtra government’s leadership on Dharavi’s redevelopment.
India ended a four-decade wait for the Asian Games women’s hockey title with a 1-0…