Donors, Not Owners: Supreme Court’s Crackdown On Commercialisation Puts Jamia Hamdard Under Regulatory Crosshairs

A university is a public trust. It is not a family business. It is not a profit machine. It is not a personal fiefdom.

That is the unambiguous message the Supreme Court of India sent to every private and deemed-to-be university in the country on 17 September 2026, in its order in Ayesha Jain v. Amity University, Noida & Ors., [W.P. (C) No. 531/2025]. The Court declared that “no private university shall be allowed to be run as a profit-making institution” and directed sweeping disclosures on finances, admissions, fees, staff and governance.

But while the order applies to all private and deemed universities, there is perhaps no institution where its implications cut deeper than Jamia Hamdard — the renowned deemed-to-be university in South Delhi, ranked No. 1 in Pharmacy in NIRF 2025 for the seventh consecutive year and accredited with an A+ NAAC grade. What students, parents, faculty and the public are now asking is a simple question: If Jamia Hamdard is not a profit-making institution, where is the money going? Why is mismanagement costing the staff and students? Why have illegal occupants been allowed to control the University until now, putting the University in crisis?

Public Land, Public Money — For Whose Benefit?

Jamia Hamdard stands on approximately 92 acres of institutional land allotted by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) in 1989. By the university’s own account, roughly Rs 500 crore of government support went into building it. The audit inspection report puts government financial support at Rs 433 crore up to 2022-23.

The land was given for one purpose: academic use. The DDA lease conditions are explicit — the land cannot be handed to anybody for any other use. Permission under Section 5 and prior permission of the DDA are mandatory before the land, or any part of it, can be released, sub-leased or put to a different purpose.

And yet, complaints to the UGC and the Ministry of Education from students, staff and employees allege that university space has been given free of cost to a funding agency — the Hamdard National Foundation (HNF), a private trust that the university’s prospectus itself describes as the body that “manages” the institution. The complainants allege that HNF occupies a large amount of university land, pays nothing for it, and has influenced major decisions, weakening the university’s independence, academic autonomy and institutional framework. The university, meanwhile, pays heavy property tax on land occupied by the agency.

The question: Was DDA permission ever sought? Was it ever granted? Do UGC regulations allow it to extend any direct or indirect benefit to the sponsoring/funding agency?

The Society That Was Reshaped — Without Government Concurrence

The Sponsoring Body Coup: How a 46-Member Council Shrank to 19

Jamia Hamdard was declared a deemed university under Section 3 of the UGC Act on 10 May 1989. The Jamia Hamdard Society, the sponsoring society, was registered on 26 April 1989 as a broad-based body approved by the Government. Its original Memorandum and Rules provided for the Chairman, the Vice-Chancellor, all living former Vice-Chancellors, nominees of the Education Ministry, the UGC, the Unani-medicine research council and the Lieutenant Governor, ten eminent scholars, the deans, and three non-teaching staff representatives — a total of over 46 members.

Section 40 of those rules was explicit: any alteration to the Society’s composition was to follow Sections 12 and 12A of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and would take effect “only after receipt of the concurrence from the Government of India.”

Deans and former Vice-Chancellors vary with office-holders.

A certified 2021 version of the Memorandum, stamped by the Registrar of Societies, reconstitutes the Society as a fixed body of just 19 voting members. The deans are gone. The former Vice-Chancellors are gone. Independent eminent scholars have been reduced from 10 to 2. The Chancellor, his direct nominees, four sponsoring-body nominees (sponsoring-body nominees within the sponsoring body — a strange, one-of-a-kind arrangement) and two nominees of a private company now account for 12 of the 19 seats — a clear majority, with the Chairman holding a casting vote in a tie.

The audit inspection report concludes that the Memorandum was modified “without obtaining approval from the competent authority, i.e. Jamia Hamdard Society”, in violation of the Societies Registration Act. The Ministry of Education’s letter of 15 January 2025 confirms that, as per its records, “no change in respect of Jamia Hamdard Society has been done by the Ministry”.

The question: Did the Ministry ever grant the concurrence that Section 40 required? Did the Society itself ever meet and approve these changes? Which Society does the Ministry recognise — the original 1989 body or the coup 19-member version?

The Chain of Illegality: From Society to Chancellor to Vice-Chancellor

Complainants allege a chain of governance violations, each built upon the last:

The Chairperson became Chancellor. They allege the Chancellor was appointed by a Society that was not lawfully constituted — with no meeting, agenda or resolution behind it — and that the Chairperson then named himself Chancellor. Regulation 21(A)(1) of the UGC (Institutions Deemed to be Universities) Regulations, 2023 permits a sponsoring body to appoint the Chancellor, but only where the institution is not managed, controlled or funded to the extent of fifty per cent or more of its annual receipts by the Central or State Government. Otherwise, the appointment is made by the Government. Given the massive public funding, complainants argue, the power to appoint the Chancellor may not even lie with the sponsoring body.

Four Executive Council members were placed without the consent of the Sponsoring Society on the Executive Council — the principal governing body of the University. A letter dated 10 October 2023, signed as “Chairman, Jamia Hamdard Society”, nominated four professors to the Executive Council under Section 11(5)(h) of the 2023 Regulations. It cites no Society resolution. The then Vice-Chancellor endorsed it the same day with a handwritten instruction to issue the notification. Complainants say there was no Society meeting, no agenda, no minutes and no resolution. The concern is structural: members who owe their seats to one individual, rather than to a Society that chose them collectively, sit inside the university’s supreme governing body.

2021 VC Selection Panel at Jamia Hamdard Breached UGC Norms; Fresh Objections Raised Over 2026 Process

Complainants have alleged that the Search-cum-Selection Committee that recommended Prof. Afshar Alam for appointment as Vice-Chancellor of Jamia Hamdard in 2021 was not constituted in accordance with Clause 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018. Their complaints are now before the UGC and the Ministry of Education (MoE).

Allegation on the committee’s composition: Regulations require that members of such a committee be persons of eminence in higher education who are not connected in any manner with the university concerned. The 2021 committee was chaired by Prof. Iqbal Husnain, who was the Pro-Chancellor of the same university. In their view, a panel headed by a person with that connection lacks the independence and neutrality the Regulations make a precondition for a valid selection.

Allegation on the candidate’s integrity: The complainants further allege that the problem goes beyond composition. Clause 7.3 requires a Vice-Chancellor to be a distinguished academician with the highest level of competence, integrity, morals and institutional commitment. They claim that, at the time of selection, Prof. Alam had been penalised by the university’s own Board of Management with a major/minor penalty on the recommendation of the CBI. They say his name was nonetheless cleared by a Chairperson who was himself connected with the university, so that the body which had earlier found against him was in effect overridden by a committee lacking independence. The complainants contend that these circumstances raise a serious question as to whether the integrity requirement of Clause 7.3 was ever tested, let alone satisfied. They argue that a selection compromised at the threshold by an ineligible Chairperson, and disregarding a recorded penalty against the candidate, cannot be sustained.

Objections to the 2026 Process: The complainants allege that the same irregularities were attempted again in the current round. They say that at the Executive Council meetings of 11 June 2026 and 22 July 2026, convened to choose the EC nominee to the Search-cum-Selection Committee for the next Vice-Chancellor, persons not authorised to act, working through the officiating Vice-Chancellor and the “old team”, tried to repeat the illegality. According to the complainants, the Registrar and the UGC nominee raised serious objections at those meetings, citing the applicable rules, and informed the UGC of the alleged illegality in writing. Prof. Alam is reportedly still in the fray as a candidate for the post. Attention now turns to how the UGC and the MoE act on the complaints.

The 22 July 2026 Decision Reversed. At the 73rd (Emergent) Executive Council meeting on 22 July 2026, nine of the eleven members present voted to nominate a nominee to the search committee. The Officiating Vice-Chancellor, chairing, stepped out for a call, returned and said the Chancellor’s Office did not agree. The UGC’s own nominee wrote on 23 July 2026 that an Officiating VC, Prof. Asgar Ali, had no authority to nullify a majority decision, that a casting vote arises only in a tie, and that the minutes should be corrected “preserving the sanctity of the Executive Council”.

The 14 August 2026 Meeting. Complainants allege that Prof. Asgar Ali, who was serving as Officiating Vice-Chancellor, turned 65 on 8 August 2026 and, under the applicable age limit, was deemed relieved of that office from that date. They say he nevertheless convened and chaired the Executive Council meeting of 14 August, six days after his deemed relinquishment. That meeting set aside the decision taken at the 22 July meeting. According to the complainants, Prof. Ali had no authority to convene or preside over the meeting, and the resolutions passed there are therefore open to challenge.

The chain is plain: a Society altered without its own and governmental approval leads to nominees named in one Chairman’s letter, to an Executive Council that helps choose the Vice-Chancellor, to a Vice-Chancellor who runs the university. If the first link is invalid, everything built on it is open to challenge.

The Funding Agency That Took Without Giving

Complainants say the funding agency’s donations have been modest — in some cases negligible — yet have been treated as a claim to ownership. The cost to the university, they allege, has been far greater than anything donated:

The matter has been reported to the higher authorities. Complainants have asked the government to check the funding and exemption trail of the funding agency.

The question: The funding agency takes crores in tax exemptions in the name of the university. Where does that money go? If it does not go to the university, what is the point of the exemption?

The Mismanagement and Governance Crisis at Jamia Hamdard: What Students and the Nation Are Paying For

The cost of the governance crisis at Jamia Hamdard has now gone beyond the campus. In July 2025, 150 MBBS seats at the Jamia Hamdard’s Hamdard Institute of Medical Sciences and Research (HIMSR) were lost due to mismanagement and a governance crisis. The denial followed a bitter administrative, financial and governance dispute between Jamia Hamdard (Deemed to be University) and HIMSR. The university had withdrawn its mandatory Consent of Affiliation (CoA), citing alleged financial irregularities and leadership gridlock.

Who bears the loss. The complainants say the seats were lost because of negligence, mismanagement and unwarranted interference by persons they describe as illegal occupants of university offices, acting on behalf of the funding agency. The loss falls first on deserving students and their parents, and it also deprives the country of medical seats at a time when they are needed. They warn that if the situation continues, the consequences will be more serious still.

What the rules say. The complainants point out that the Government of India and the Supreme Court have repeatedly issued and amended regulations and guidelines to ensure a fair and transparent system. These are meant to ensure that no funding or sponsoring body gains undue advantage or control over the institution it supports. In their words, not even a single inch of the university’s land or assets may be placed under the control of such a body, because that separation is what keeps the system transparent. In their view, the ongoing tussle for control runs against this principle, and the medical seats were its first casualty.

What they want. The complainants say the matter must now be taken up seriously by the UGC, the Ministry of Education and the Supreme Court. They argue that the problem can be resolved quickly if the persons they allege are exercising control over the university illegally are removed. Until then, they say, institutional stability will remain out of reach.

The Accountability Storm: Complaints Everywhere

The legal troubles facing the families and top management of Jamia Hamdard are not confined to one forum. Complaints have been filed with:

The employees have also raised a critical issue: the outsourcing of the university’s finance-related functions to KPMG and subsequently to Deloitte. They allege this move has implications for administrative control and university finances. Complainants further allege that the admission process has been handed over to Deloitte, with neither the Controller of Examinations, nor the Registrar, nor the Vice-Chancellor having control over it. Altogether, there are doubts about the vicious plan to control and take over the university illegally by unauthorised claimants. The data of students — a sensitive matter under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 — is allegedly in the hands of a third party, exposing the university to an imminent threat.

What the Supreme Court Order Demands — and What It Means for Jamia Hamdard

The Supreme Court’s order of 17 September 2026 is not merely a statement of principle. It is a detailed, enforceable set of directions that every private and deemed university must comply with. The Court directed:

1. Financial Disclosures: Audited reports for the preceding five years, setting out complete details of funds generated and their utilisation; payments made to individuals not directly involved in the university’s functioning; and benefits received from the Central or State Governments, including land allotments and relaxations.
2. Admissions, Examinations and Fee Collection: The exact procedure adopted for admitting students in each course, including who is in charge of admissions, setting of papers, conduct of examinations, evaluation of answer sheets, handling of funds and the role of the management.
3. Surplus Funds Utilisation: How surplus funds are dealt with, including investments made from such funds.
4. Teaching and Non-Teaching Staff: Mode of recruitment, salaries, emoluments, service conditions, classes allotted and actually taken since January 2025, and alternative arrangements made when teachers were unavailable.
5. Grievance Redressal: Composition of committees, nature of grievances, number of complaints, outcomes and time taken for resolution over the last three years.
6. Directions to Affiliating Bodies: Details of inspections conducted, faculty and staff basis for recognition, deficiencies identified and whether they have been rectified.
7. Directions to Governments: The Union of India, States and UTs must obtain the relevant details from universities and file affidavits personally affirmed by their Chief Secretaries within six weeks.

The Court made it clear that States have the power, including by taking coercive measures, to ensure that the information is brought on record.

The Road Ahead: Hope for Students, Warning for Owners

The Ministry of Education and the UGC have taken cognisance of the complaints. A high-powered inquiry commission is expected shortly to check the irregularities based on the Supreme Court’s directions. Sources indicate that the government is serious about ensuring high-quality education at minimum fees, especially where the land and buildings belong to the government, and that the Jamia Hamdard matter may serve as the template for reform across the sector.

The UGC’s own regulations provide the standard that Jamia Hamdard must now meet:

• Regulation 11: All movable and immovable assets of a deemed university are to be used for academic activities, research and related administration.
• Regulation 31: The university’s accounts are to be kept in the university’s own name, not that of the sponsoring body, and funds are not to be diverted to the sponsoring body or any other body.
• Regulation 24: Donations or capitation fees in any form are prohibited, and fees are to be fixed transparently, keeping in view non-profiteering.

The test for Jamia Hamdard is simple: every space and every rupee should serve the university, not an outside agency.

The Larger Question: Who Owns a University?

Hakeem Abdul Hameed, the founder of Jamia Hamdard, was a physician who served the poorest of the poor. He built a complex of educational institutions over decades, which were amalgamated into a deemed university in May 1989. His vision was to enable the minority community to go forward and help India march forward.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan built Aligarh Muslim University. Do his descendants claim ownership of AMU? No. Jamia Millia Islamia was built collectively on community land, and no one claims ownership. Why should Jamia Hamdard be any different? Why are the descendants of Hakim sb claiming ownership of Jamia Hamdard, which was built on DDA land and with public funding from the government?

A Donor Is Not an Owner

The Supreme Court has now made the principle clear: those who fund or sponsor a university are donors, not owners. A public institution cannot be treated as the private property of any donor, and a public trust cannot be turned into a family fiefdom.

For students — they pay fees of Rs 10 lakh, Rs 12 lakh and Rs 15 lakh for courses that should be far more affordable, given the public land and funding behind the institution. For them, the Court’s order offers a ray of hope.

For faculty and staff — they have lived with opaque recruitment, uncertain service conditions and a governance structure that answers to no one. For them, the order carries a promise of accountability.

For the public — their land and money built this institution. For them, the order is a long-overdue demand for transparency.

The Supreme Court has spoken. The Ministry and UGC are moving. The question now is: will Jamia Hamdard’s management comply, or will it continue to treat a public university as a family business?

The answer will determine not just the future of one institution, but the fate of higher education in India.